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I. INTRODUCTION
Commentators following Perry v. Schwarzenegger1 in which plaintiffs
mounted federal constitutional attacks against the State of California's
constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage, have dubbed it "the
highest-profile civil rights case of the decade." 2 Indeed, Perry has-and
will continue to have-palpable significance. Though Perry is not the
* Briefing Attorney to the Honorable Justice Rebecca Simmons, Fourth Court of
Appeals of Texas; J.D., The University of Texas, 2010, with honors; B.A., Trinity
University, 2007, cum laude. The author worked on Perry v. Schwarzenegger at the San
Francisco City Attorney's Office during the summer of 2009.
1. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
2. See, e.g., John Rogers, Ted Olson Supports Carly Fiorina's Senate Bid. Carly Fi-
orina Supports Prop & Huh!, QUEERTY.COM (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.queerty.com/ted-
olson-supports-carly-fiorinas-senate-bid-carly-fiorina-supports-prop-8-huh- 2 0100804 .
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first federal constitutional challenge to the prohibition of same-sex mar-
riage, it is the first instance of a federal trial court making findings of fact
regarding same-sex marriage.
After the trial judge, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker, issued the court's
opinion favoring the plaintiffs and enjoining Proposition 8's enforce-
ment,4 the defendant-intervenors5 filed a Notice of Appeal and requested
a stay of the court's order until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dresses the merits.' Judge Walker denied the defendant-intervenors' re-
quest for a stay because, among other things, the defendants were
unlikely to succeed on the merits, as they lacked Article III standing to
3. See Maura Dolan, Prop. 8 Trial to Include Unprecedented Testimony, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/11/local/la-me-prop8-trialll-2010janl1
("'This is the first time that you will have this kind of record being made' on the social,
religious and legal implications of same-sex marriage."). The trial court's fact finding was
based on testimony from witnesses claiming a right to same-sex marriage and contending
that Proposition 8 violated their constitutional guarantees. Id. The two same-sex couples
that initially filed suit testified to their personal experience in pursuit of the right to marry.
Id. Numerous experts also testified about the historical pattern "of discrimination against
homosexuals and the history of marriage." Id.
4. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that
the enforcement of Proposition 8 is unconstitutional). "The evidence shows conclusively
that Proposition 8 enacts, without reason, a private moral view that same-sex couples are
inferior to opposite-sex couples." Id. As the Supreme Court noted in Romer v. Evans,
animus does not provide a rational basis for the government to withhold rights from a class
of people. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
5. The defendants in Perry included California government officials ("official defend-
ants") and a group of proponents that supported Proposition 8 and intervened in the case
("defendant-intervenors"). For a further discussion of the defendants in this case refer to
Section B, Part III of this Article.
6. Notice of Appeal, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(No. 09-CV-2292 VRW) (notifying all relevant parties of the defendants' intent to appeal
the decision); Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2-3, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that the defendants wanted
the courts' decision to be suspended pending the ruling from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals). Defendants argued four main points in their motion. First, they argued that
even if the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and stated that Proposition 8 violated the
Constitution, the defendants would nevertheless win on appeal; thus it would be better to
just suspend the judgment. Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at
2-4, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Second, they reasoned
that allowing same-sex marriages before the appeal would create administrative problems
in having to revoke any marriages that took place between the judgment and the appeal,
and would also create unnecessary anxiety for the couples relying on the judgment. Id,
Third, they noted that the plaintiffs had actually mentioned that they had chosen not to get
married until they were certain the ruling would not be overturned and their marriage
revoked. Id. at 6. Finally, defendants pointed out that granting a stay of execution of the
judgment would be best for Californians in that it would prevent uncertainty, while main-
taining the sanctity of marriage in the way the citizens had been supporting it through their
voting efforts in the past. Id. at 6-7.
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challenge the trial court's decision.' The defendant-intervenors then ap-
pealed Judge Walker's judgment and order denying the stay to the Ninth
Circuit, which is expected to release its decision on the stay in early 2011.8
Regardless of the outcome at the Ninth Circuit, many expect the losing
party to seek review by the Supreme Court of the United States9 because
either party may file a writ of certiorari before or after a decision by the
Ninth Circuit.1 o
This Article discusses the progression of Perry from the filing of the
case to its current status before the Ninth Circuit. It also offers an in-
depth analysis of both the history of the case and the trial court's deci-
sion, hopefully serving as a springboard and reference for future scholarly
discussions of this case's potential impact on sexual orientation's constitu-
tional situation. Part II of this Article reviews the relatively recent legal
history of same-sex marriage in California, tracing the events that ulti-
mately culminated in Proposition 8, which is the subject of Perry's contro-
versy. Part III introduces the parties to Perry, explains the bases for their
involvement in the case, and describes their constitutional arguments for
and against Proposition 8. Part IV summarizes and explains the trial
court's decision on the merits. Part V concludes this Article with a legal
analysis of Perry's possible future.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN CALIFORNIA
Since it gained statehood in 1849, the Constitution of the State of Cali-
fornia conceptualized marriage as consisting of a husband and a wife."
7. Order Denying Defendant-Intervenors' Motion to Stay Pending Appeal at 6, Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), available at https://ecf.cand.us-
courts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/Final stay-order.pdf (discussing when granting a stay is
appropriate).
8. Jillian Jones, Prop. 8 Debate May Not Settle Until 2011, NAPA VAU L-EY REG., Aug.
21, 2010, http://napavalleyregister.com/news/local/article4518e8bc-adaa-1ldf-9e7c-001cc4
c002e.html. Though usually the process would take much longer, the Ninth Circuit has
scheduled oral arguments regarding Judge Walker's order for early December 2010, con-
siderably expediting the process. Id. However, same-sex marriages in California will re-
main suspended until the Ninth Circuit issues its opinion on the trial court's order in
denying the stay. Id. The stay would effectively reinstate Proposition 8 until the Ninth
Circuit's decision is handed down in early 2011. Id.
9. David Cole, How Will Gay Marriage Fare in the Supreme Court?, N.Y. Reqv. or
BOOKS BiLOG (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/aug/
11/how-will-gay-marriage-fare-supreme-court (speculating about the possible outcomes
"[i]f and when" Perry v. Schwarzenegger is heard by the Supreme Court).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006) (explaining the requirements for an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States).
11. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (providing
historical references to California's interpretation of marriage). According to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the first session of the California legislature assumed marriage in-
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In 2000, California statutorily prohibited State recognition of same-sex
marriages.12 The California Family Code defined-and continues to de-
fine-marriage as a contract between "a man" and "a woman."" Though
county clerks throughout California consequently refused to issue mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples following the enactment of this statu-
tory proscription,' 4 Gavin Newsom, the Mayor of the City and County of
San Francisco," directed the San Francisco County Clerk to depart from
the routine practices of other counties and issue marriage licenses to ap-
plicants without regard to sex or sexual orientation.16 Mayor Newsom
supported his directive with decisions from other states' courts that held
volved persons of the opposite sex. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 407 (Cal. 2008).
"California's current marriage statutes derive in part from [its] Civil Code, enacted in
1872," which requires a man and a woman to be of a certain age before being able to
consent to marriage. Id. at 408-09.
12. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (describing
the events that led to the passage of Proposition 8). California voters adopted the Califor-
nia Defense of Marriage Act, also known as Proposition 22, in November 2000. Id. Pro-
position 22 amended the California Family Code to require marriage be only between a
man and a woman. CAL. FAM. CoDE § 308.5 (Deering 2006), invalidated by Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The City of San Francisco and
other parties filed actions in state court challenging Proposition 22 as violating the equal
protection rights of same-sex couples. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928
(N.D. Cal. 2010). In May 2008, Proposition 22 was overturned, allowing the issuance of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples until the passage of Proposition 8. Id.
13. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (Deering Supp. 2009) ("Marriage is a personal relation
arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the
parties capable of making that contract is necessary."). As of September 2010, thirty-nine
states passed laws defining marriage as between a man and a woman, effectively banning
same-sex marriage. See Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships,
NAT'L CONF. o S-iFA-mE LEcs., http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last visited
Oct. 19, 2010). On the other hand, five states and the District of Columbia have passed
laws allowing the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples: Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire. Id. Additionally, three states-New York,
Maryland, and Rhode Island-recognize same-sex marriages conducted in other states
even though they themselves do not allow issuance of licenses to same-sex couples. Id.
14. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (Deering Supp. 2009) (constructively prohibiting
same-sex marriage); CAL. FAM. CODE § 350(a) (Deering 2006) (explaining the role of
county clerks in the marriage process). In California, county clerks are necessarily part of
the process required to make a marriage legally binding because the parties "shall first
obtain a marriage license from a county clerk" before entering into a marriage agreement.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 350(a) (Deering 2006).
15. This Article collectively refers to the City and County of San Francisco as "San
Francisco."
16. Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004) (identifying the
events that served as the basis for the litigation). The county clerk created gender-neutral
documents to be used by same-sex couples in applying for, and obtaining a marriage li-
cense. Id. at 465. These new forms also contained a proviso that warned applicants that
their marriage might not be recognized by anyone other than San Francisco. Id.
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the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples violated their constitu-
tional guarantees of privacy, due process, and equal protection.' 7
Several opponents of same-sex marriage challenged San Francisco's
practice of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples by requesting
judicial stays of the practice."* In Lockyer v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco," the California Supreme Court held that San Francisco officials
exceeded their authority by issuing marriage licenses in contravention of
state statute.20 Then-Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed an original pe-
tition in the California Supreme Court, seeking to enjoin the city's prac-
tice.21 The Court issued a stay, holding that Mayor Newsom's directive-
despite its good faith basis-was premature in the absence of a judicial
decree on the matter.2 2
Same-sex couples who subsequently applied for, but were denied mar-
riage licenses filed challenges to California's limited definition of mar-
riage, advancing substantially similar grounds as Mayor Newsom: that the
prohibition violated the State constitution's privacy, due process, and
equal protection guarantees." The California Supreme Court consoli-
17. Id. at 464-65 (explaining the legal theory of San Francisco's defense in reference
to the equal protection clause of the California Constitution).
18. Id. at 465 (describing the attempts of opponents to same-sex marriage to stop the
recording of same-sex marriages by the county clerk). Two individual actions were filed in
an attempt to obtain an immediate stay of San Francisco granting marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. Id. at 465-66. The San Francisco Superior Court declined to grant an
immediate stay after conducting hearings for both of the actions. Id. at 466. In these pro-
ceedings the City advanced a cross-complaint requesting a declaration from the court stat-
ing statutes that disallow the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses were unconstitutional.
Id. at 466 n.6.
19. 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
20. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 463 (Cal. 2004). The court noted that the power to interpret
and determine the constitutionality of a statute enacted by the legislature lies with the
judiciary-not with an executive official. Id.
21. Id. at 464 n.2 (discussing Attorney General Lockyer's role in the events leading up
to the Perry case).
22. Id. at 483, 499 (finding against San Francisco, and voiding all same-sex marriages
issued by the county clerk prior to this decision).
23. Compare In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 404 (Cal. 2008), superseded by con-
stitutional amendment CAL. CONs-r. art. 1 § 7.5 (describing the various challenges brought
by same-sex couples and how they are mirrored after the Mayor of San Francisco's argu-
ments), with Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464-65 (Cal. 2004).
Although the same-sex couples challenged the Constitution on the grounds of privacy, due
process, and equal protection, the Superior Court only analyzed their challenge in terms of
equal protection. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 404 (Cal. 2008), superseded by consti-
tutional amendment CAL. CONsr. art. I § 7.5. The lower court applied strict scrutiny analy-
sis to the equal protection claim, finding there was no legitimate state interest in outlawing
same-sex marriages. Id. Upon review by the court of appeals, the decision of the lower
court was reversed for various reasons, specifically with the lower courts' characterization
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dated these cases on appeal in In re Marriage Cases,2 4 in which it struck
down the State's statutory definition of marriage. 25 The Court reasoned
that legal classifications on the basis of sexual orientation do not pass
muster under a strict scrutiny analysis, and, therefore, violate the State's
constitutional guarantees of equal protection, privacy, and due process. 2 6
Immediately following In re Marriage Cases, approximately eighteen
thousand same-sex couples successfully obtained marriage licenses from
counties throughout California.2 1 Opponents of same-sex marriage
launched a ballot initiative measure to reverse the decision that permitted
these marriages. 28 The measure, known as Proposition 8, proposed to
engraft the following language into the constitution: "Only marriage be-
tween a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." 29 On
November 4, 2008, California voters favoring Proposition 8-organized
of the fundamental right to marry and its standard of review under the equal protection
clause. Id.
24. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment CAL. CONsT.
art. 1 § 7.5.
25. Id. at 401 (holding California's current definition of marriage is not a compelling
state interest). The court began its discussion with the current definition of marriage by
exploring how marriage was characterized in statutes from the 1800s. Id. at 407-10. It
acknowledged that "the statutory designation of marriage as a relationship between a man
and woman has remained unchanged." Id. at 408. The court discussed changes made in
the 1960s and 1970s, including the elimination of "male" and "female" references in the
consent section that ultimately resulted in same-sex couples trying to apply for marriage
certificates. Id. at 408-09. Legislation resulting from this confusion in the 1970s provided
a basis for the current definition of marriage, and the court acknowledged that the parties
to the suit agreed that the current statutory language "limits marriages that lawfully may
be performed in California to marriages of opposite-sex couples." Id. at 409.
26. Id. at 401, 429 (determining the proper standard of review and holding the statute
could not withstand the constitutionally required scrutiny). The petitioners argued strict
scrutiny should be the standard of review applied to their equal protection challenge, rea-
soning they were a suspect class being subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex or
gender. Id. at 401. The court disagreed, but applied strict scrutiny analysis anyway, com-
paring it to gender, race, and religion. Id. The court reasoned that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is "a constitutionally suspect basis upon which to impose differential
treatment." Id. It further reasoned strict scrutiny analysis was necessary because the ex-
clusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage infringed on their fundamental
interest to enjoy the same family relationships as opposite-sex couples. Id.
27. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
28. Id. (approval of Proposition 8 in November 2008 brought the issuance of marriage
licenses for same-sex couples to a halt).
29. Id. at 927 (explaining arguments opponents of same-sex marriage have raised in
support of Proposition 8). Proponents explain, "Proposition 8 is about preserving mar-
riage; it's not an attack on the gay lifestyle." Id. at 930 (emphasis omitted). Although
proponents of Proposition 8 agree that homosexuals have the right to their lifestyle in
private, they strongly disagree with redefining the traditional definition of marriage for
society. Id.
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primarily by the Yes On 8 Campaign and Perry's defendant-intervenors-
defeated the Proposition's opponents by a 52.3%-to-47.7% vote.3 o
Same-sex couples that were unable to procure marriage licenses post-
Proposition 8 filed suit to challenge the amendment. 3 ' The California Su-
preme Court consolidated three such cases and, in Strauss v. Horton,3 2
affirmed the validity of the amendment.33 The Strauss plaintiffs pled that
Proposition 8, which carved out an exception to the guarantees of Cali-
fornia's Constitution, was invalid because it constituted a revision that
required a prior approval of two-thirds of the California Senate and As-
sembly.34 They also argued the State constitution's protection-of-minor-
ity function was judicial in nature, and could not be altered through the
legislative process without violating the constitutional concept of separa-
tion of powers." The plaintiffs finally contended that Proposition 8 did
not retroactively nullify the same-sex marriages that occurred post-In re
Marriage Cases and pre-Proposition 8.36 Though the California Supreme
Court held that Proposition 8 was neither an invalid revision of the Con-
stitution nor a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, it protected
the eighteen thousand couples from retroactive application of Proposi-
tion 8 because the text of the measure did not expressly apply to past
same-sex marriages." The same day that the California Supreme Court
announced its decision in Strauss, two same-sex couples filed suit in the
30. See 2008 Proposition 8 Map, CAL. SECREIARY OF STATE DEBRA BROWN, http://
www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/maps/returns/props/prop-8.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2010) (establishing that supporters of Proposition 8 edged out opponents by a
4.6% margin).
31. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 68 (Cal. 2009).
32. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
33. Id. at 63-64.
34. Id. at 61, 78-79. An amendment may be proposed by either the legislature or by
proposition of the voters, but a revision must be brought forth by either the legislature or a
constitutional convention. Id. at 79-80.
35. Id. at 114 (explaining that separation of powers does not preclude the possibility
of lawful cross-consideration of issues by more than one branch of government). The
plaintiff's contention was based on the idea that the separation of powers doctrine estab-
lishes sharp lines that divides the government into three distinct entities. Id. at 114-15
(citing Superior Court v. Cnty. of Mendocino, 913 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Cal. 1996)). The Cali-
fornia courts have consistently held that these lines are not iron-clad and that to deny the
interrelationships of the different branches is unrealistic. Id. at 155. As such, the lines may
be crossed occasionally and one branch may permissibly reverse what another branch has
done if that reversal is necessary to maintain a balance in the process. Id. at 115.
36. Id. at 119 (addressing the effect of the language in Proposition 8 on marriages that
occurred before its enactment). Without decisive language explicitly stating to the con-
trary, a newly enacted rule only applies prospectively, regardless of whether it was created
through legislative action or the initiative process. Id.
37. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59, 122.
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federal district court of the Northern District of California, arguing that
Proposition 8 violated the U.S. Constitution.
III. TI-IE PARTIES TO PERRY
A. The Plaintiffs
The Perry plaintiffs initially consisted of two same-sex couples. One
couple, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, lives together in Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, with their four children.4 0 Perry and Stier became partners in
2000. They initially received a marriage license from San Francisco in
2004 prior to Lockyer, which resulted in the stay and invalidated mar-
riage licenses issued by the City.41 Given the legal uncertainty surround-
ing the recognition of same-sex marriage, the couple decided against
getting married even after In re Marriage Cases to avoid further disap-
pointment. 4 2 After the passage of Proposition 8, a team of high-profile
activists and attorneys-including Ted Olson and David Boies, former ad-
versaries in the Supreme Court's 2000 decision, Bush v. Gore4 3 -ap-
proached Perry and Stier, persuading them to become plaintiffs to
challenge the amendment on federal constitutional grounds. 44
The other couple, Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo, joined Perry and
Stier in their challenge to Proposition 8. Katami and Zarrillo became
38. See generally Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV-09-02292 VRW), 2009 WL
1490740 (claiming unequal treatment based on sexual orientation violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment).
39. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that
although the original plaintiffs in Perry only consisted of one same-sex couple, other same-
sex couples subsequently joined the suit).
40. Id. (discussing the background of the parties).
41. See Eve Conant, Accidental Activists, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.news-
week.com/2010/01/10/accidental-activists.html (concluding that San Francisco's issuance of
marriage licenses before being enjoined by Lockyer is legally void).
42. Id. (discussing the state of uncertainty surrounding same-sex couples and their
desire to legally marry).
43. 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (deciding whether Florida's procedures for resolving the
2000 Presidential election violated the U.S. Constitution). Ted Olson, a Republican, ar-
gued for George W. Bush in Bush v. Gore, while David Boies, a Democrat, represented Al
Gore. Tony Castro, Proposition 8 Battle Heading to Federal Arena, DAiY NEws oF Los
ANGELES, May 28, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 16515614. The American Founda-
tion for Legal Rights originally contacted Olson for the case, and Olson later brought on
Boies to join him as co-counsel. Id.
44. Eve Conant, Accidental Activists, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.news-
week.com/20I0/01/10/accidental-activists.htmI (reflecting Perry's decision to take the nec-
essary steps to file a lawsuit that would challenge Proposition 8).
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partners in 2001.45 In 2009, their application for a marriage license was
denied due to Proposition 8.46 Unlike Perry and Stier, though, Katami
and Zarrillo have delayed starting a family until their relationship was
solidified through marriage.4 7
Finally, San Francisco and several gay and lesbian rights organizations
moved to intervene in the case as plaintiffs in July 2009.48 San Francisco
based its motion to intervene on the grounds that Proposition 8 com-
pelled it to violate the rights of its citizens.4 9 In its motion to intervene,
San Francisco opposed the intervention by several gay and lesbian rights
organizations, arguing that intervention would result in unnecessary in-
terference and delay.s0 In August 2009, Chief Judge Walker granted the
45. Transcript of Proceedings Vol. 1 at 80, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW) (detailing the direct-examination testimony
of Jeffery Zarrillo).
46. Id. at 88 (recounting the effect Proposition 8 had on Katami and Zarillo's ability
to be legally married as a same-sex couple in California). Katami testified that he felt
being married would give more meaning to his relationship with Zarillo. Id. at 88-89.
47. Id. at 89 (citing the fact that Zarrillo and Katimi felt it necessary to wait to have
children because of Proposition 8). Katami wanted to get married not only to show his
dedication to the relationship, but also specifically so their children "won't have to say,
'[m]y dad and dad are domestic partners.'" Id.
48. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (naming par-
ties seeking leave to intervene); see also Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene as
Party Plaintiff; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 6, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW), 2009 WL 1995823. San Fran-
cisco also petitioned the court to intervene as a party plaintiff claiming to have a substan-
tial factual record. Press Release, City of San Francisco, San Francisco Moves to Intervene
in Federal Challenge to Proposition 8 (July 23, 2009), available at http://www.sfcityattorney.
org/index.aspx?page=170. The City cited its work in the In re Marriage Cases that had
provided "extensive evidence and proposed findings on strict scrutiny factors and factual
rebuttals to long claimed justifications for marriage discrimination." Id.
49. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928-29 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (interven-
ing against enforcement of Proposition 8); see also Notice of Motion and Motion to Inter-
vene as Party Plaintiff; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 8, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292), 2009 WL
2350844.
50. Carlos Santoscoy, Gay Groups Not Welcome in Federal Marriage Suit, ON Toir
MAG., Aug. 8, 2009, http://www.ontopmag.com/article.aspx?id=4349&MediaType=1&Cate-
gory=26 (reporting on an attempt made by gay rights organizations to intervene in Perry).
The groups wishing to intervene, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Lambda Legal,
and the ACLU, are collectively known as Our Family Coalition. Id. The group funding
the lead plaintiff in the Perry case, the American Foundation for Equal Rights, had serious
qualms about letting the gay rights organizations intervene due to their reluctance to pur-
sue previous litigation in federal courts, which the plaintiffs see as a sign that they will not
zealously pursue this case if allowed to intervene. Id. According to Santoscoy, the reluc-
tance to litigate on the part of Our Family Coalition was due to their belief that the current
Supreme Court makeup is too conservative, and that a loss at that level would be harmful
to their cause. Id.
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City's motion to intervene, but denied the motions of the gay and lesbian
rights organizations.1
At trial, the plaintiffs argued that Proposition 8 violates both the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.5 2 The plaintiffs asserted that Pro-
position 8 violates the Due Process Clause by limiting the choice of a
consenting adult partner to marry, because the same-sex marriage ban
substantially burdens the fundamental right of marriage.53 Further, mod-
ern Supreme Court precedent has always been characterized by the
choice of who to marry.54 The plaintiffs proceeded to rebut six offered
justifications for Proposition 8-procreation, responsible procreation, tra-
dition, interstate recognition of California's marriages, administrative
convenience, and moral disapproval-as failing to constitute compelling,
or even legitimate, government interests.5 5
51. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928-29 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (detailing
the procedural history of this action); see also Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene as
Party Plaintiff; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 4, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW), 2009 WL 1995823. Judge
Walker denied the motions of the gay and lesbian rights organizations on the grounds that
their interests were "indistinguishable from those advanced by the Plaintiffs." Chuleenan
Svetvilas, Challenging Prop. 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAW., Jan. 2010, http://www.cal
lawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=906575&evid=1.
52. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-intervenor's Trial Memorandum at 1, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-cv-02292 VRW), 2009 WL
4718815 (listing the causes that will be presented at trial).
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. ("'Choices about marriage' are 'sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment
against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect."') (quoting M.L.B. v.
S.L.J. ex rel. S.L.J. , 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996)).
55. Id. at 5-9. The plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenors contended the procreation
argument fails because heterosexuals incapable of producing offspring are still permitted
to marry. Id. at 6. They argued that gay and lesbian marriage has no effect on procreation
activities or marriage rates of heterosexuals. Id. Plaintiffs also argued there is no evidence
to show a difference in the quality of the environment for children in either heterosexual
or homosexual households. Id. at 7. Further, the proponents' argument that the institution
of marriage has remained constant over the years does not comport with history. Id. at 8.
Marriage has evolved with society to reflect current needs and values. Plaintiffs' and Plain-
tiff-Intervenor's Trial Memorandum at 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW), 2009 WL 4718815. Forsaking fundamental
rights merely because other states might not recognize them is hardly a credible argument.
Id. Likewise, administrative convenience is no excuse for discrimination and according to
the Supreme Court, does not constitute a legitimate state interest. Id. at 9; see Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (holding administrative convenience cannot survive inter-
mediate scrutiny because administrative convenience is not an important governmental
objective); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (finding adminis-
trative convenience cannot serve as a governmental interest under a strict scrutiny frame-
work in relation to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
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The plaintiffs argued two separate violations of the Equal Protection
Clause.5 6 First, Proposition 8 impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation. 7 This argument posited that the amendment denies
gays and lesbians the opportunity to marry the person they love, but not
heterosexual individuals. 8 Gays and lesbians are a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect class deserving of strict or at least heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause because there is a history of discrimination
against homosexuals-a group that continues to remain relatively power-
less." Further, sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic unre-
lated to one's ability to contribute to society.o Alternatively, Proposition
8 fails even under the rational basis test and thus constituted a "bare ...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group[, which] cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest." 61
The plaintiffs' second Equal Protection Clause argument claimed that
Proposition 8 impermissibly discriminates on the basis of sex, and, as
56. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Intervenor's Trial Memorandum at 10-15, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW), 2009 WL
4718815 (arguing Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause for more than one
reason).
57. Id. at 11 (examining the implications of sexual orientation and how statutes classi-
fying individuals based on sexual orientation should be scrutinized). Sexual orientation,
the plaintiffs argued, falls under the right of privacy and deserves to be recognized as a
fundamental right. Id. at 11-12; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). As Justice
Kennedy stated in Lawrence, "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 562 (2003). Plaintiffs also argued that sexual orientation does not relate to one's abil-
ity to contribute to society in a meaningful and positive way. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Inter-
venor's Trial Memorandum at 12, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW), 2009 WL 4718815.
58. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Intervenor's Trial Memorandum at 11, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW), 2009 WL
4718815 (demonstrating the inequality of domestic partnerships compared to the institu-
tion of marriage). The right to marry is a fundamental interest and any statutory classifica-
tion that significantly interferes with the fulfillment of that right warrants an extensive
evaluation of the state interests purported to be advanced by such classification. Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). Reasonable regulations that do not cause direct inter-
ference will not be subject to such exacting scrutiny. Id. at 386.
59. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Intervenor's Trial Memorandum at 11, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW), 2009 WL
4718815 (demonstrating the inequality of domestic partnerships compared to the institu-
tion of marriage).
60. Id. (arguing Proposition 8 must be held to a higher level of scrutiny than rational
basis because the right to marry is a fundamental right).
61. Id. at 14 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 627, 634 (1996) (explaining animosity
towards a group cannot form the basis of a legitimate public policy)).
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such, must substantially relate to an important governmental objective.62
This contention asserted that Proposition 8 constitutes a sex-based classi-
fication because it denies a woman the right to marry a person that the
law permits a man to marry.63
B. The Defendants
The original defendants to the suit included an array of state officials,
such as Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Attorney General Edmund
Brown, and several county clerks." After Attorney General Brown re-
fused to defend Proposition 8, conceding its unconstitutionality and the
remaining state officials' failure to take a position on the merits of the
case, 6 5 the proponents of Proposition 8 that were responsible for putting
the measure on the ballot and galvanizing its support moved to intervene
as defendants in the suit.6 6 Chief Judge Walker granted leave to inter-
vene in July 2009.67 Proposition 8's proponents founded and facilitated
the Yes on 8 Campaign through its organization, ProtectMarriage.com. 6 8
62. Id. at 14-15 (asserting that the court must employ at least intermediate scrutiny
when analyzing Proposition 8). The State had the burden to prove that a sex-based classifi-
cation is "substantially related" to an "important government purpose." Id. at 15.
63. Id.
64. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
65. Id. at 928-29 (discussing the procedural history of the case).
66. Id. at 930 (demonstrating the proponent's eventual failure to establish the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining the traditional marriage in the district court). Two groups,
the official proponents of Proposition 8 led by Dennis Hillingsworth and a rival group, the
Campaign for California Families, sought to intervene as defendants. Notice of Motion
and Motion for Intervention by Campaign for California Families at 1, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW), 2009 WL
6594262; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928-29 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see An-
swer of Proposed Intervenors at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW) 2009 WL 1562716. The court allowed the official propo-
nents to intervene, but denied the Campaign for California Families' request. Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The Campaign for California
Families appealed. Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir.
2010). The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling stating that each party shared
the "ultimate objective" and therefore, had adequate representation. Perry v. Proposition
8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2009). While the Attorney General con-
ceded that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional, Governor Schwarzenegger remained more
neutral, but supported the lawsuit because the Proposition 8 conflict asks "important con-
stitutional questions that require and warrant judicial determination." Maura Dolan, Gov.
Won't Defend Proposition 8, L.A. TIMns (June 18, 2009), available at 2009 WL 11613112,
67. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that
the proponents were granted leave to defend Proposition 8 in early July of 2009).
68. Id. at 930, 954 (explaining that the original supporters of Proposition 8 came to-
gether again to defend Proposition 8). As noted previously, it is presumed the proponents
sought to intervene because of the lack of interest on the part of officials in the State of
California. Id. at 928.
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Notable members of the organization include the "Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints . . . the California Catholic Conference and a large
number of evangelical churches." 6 9
The Perry defendant-intervenors responded to the plaintiffs' Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection arguments in turn.70 They argued that Pro-
position 8 was not subject to strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause
because it imposed no burden on the fundamental right to marry.7' The
defendant-intervenors offered the following reasons: first, there is no fun-
damental right to same-sex marriage because marriage has historically
been defined as a union between two people of the opposite sex. 7 2 Sec-
ond, the definitional expansion of marriage to include interracial mar-
riage and permit no-fault divorce did not fundamentally alter the
institution of marriage the way permitting same-sex marriage would.
And third, the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas74 recog-
nized the constitutional right only to sexual behavior in the home.
69. Id. at 930, 955 (describing the influential role that members of Protect Marriage
played in passing Proposition 8 into law).
70. Defendant-Intervenors' Trial Memorandum at 1-2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW) (claiming that neither due pro-
cess rights nor guarantees of equal protection under the law justify the court in striking
down Proposition 8 in spite of the result of California's public referendum). Current Su-
preme Court precedent declares that the traditional male-female concept of marriage does
not conflict with personal rights afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Therefore,
since no fundamental right is being violated, under this view, the proper level of scrutiny
by the court should be rational-basis review. Id.
71. Id. at 2 (arguing that the traditional definition of marriage as acknowledged by the
people of the state of California in Proposition 8 violates no protected fundamental right
under the U.S. Constitution and thus does not merit strict-scrutiny review).
72. Id. at 2-3. The overwhelming popular consensus, the defendant-intervenors ar-
gued, acknowledges that concepts of marriage have always been limited to men and wo-
men and generally envision procreation as its purpose. Id. Further, the Supreme Court
has never contemplated a definition of marriage that includes a same-sex union. Id.
73. Id. at 3 (cautioning the court from inferring that same-sex marriage is somehow
analogous to or made lawful by the acceptance of no-fault divorce or interracial marriage).
To support their argument, the defendant-intervenors pointed to precedent concerning
miscegenation, coverture, and no-fault divorce and the fact they all shared the common
theme that marriage was defined between a man and a woman. Id. at 3-4. As such, the
defendant-intervenors argue, their impact on the law did not logically broaden the defini-
tion of marriage to include homosexual unions. Id.
74. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute making "deviate sexual inter-
course" illegal between persons of the same sex violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause).
75. Defendant-Intervenors' Trial Memorandum at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW) (noting defendant-intervenors' ar-




Regarding the Equal Protection Clause challenges, the defendant-in-
tervenors countered that Proposition 8 was subject only to rational basis
review because it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, and
based on Ninth Circuit precedent in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industry
Security Clearance Office,7 6 sexual orientation is not a suspect or quasi-
suspect class. 7 They argued sexual orientation was not immutable, but
rather "a complex and amorphous phenomenon that defies consistent
and uniform definition.",7  The defendants also refuted the claims of
prior discrimination against and the relative political powerlessness of
gays and lesbians.79 They also responded that same-sex couples do not
contribute to society in the same way that opposite sex couples do, be-
cause the latter has procreative capacities where the former does not.so
The defendants concluded this point by claiming that no court has ever
held that a prohibition of same-sex marriage constituted sex discrimina-
tion." After arguing for the application of the rational basis test, the
defendants offered a laundry list of forty-seven interests to which Pro-
position 8 was rationally related.82
76. 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining why the court applied a rational basis
standard of review).
77. See Defendant-Intervenors' Trial Memorandum at 4, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW), 2009 WL 4718817 (urging the
court to adopt a rational basis review of Proposition 8).
78. Id. at 5 (arguing for the proposition that sexual orientation is a choice rather than
an inherent personal trait).
79. See id. at 5-6 (claiming gays and lesbians are more accepted than ever before in
society and that, short of gay marriage, every proposed policy supporting homosexuals in
California has become law).
80. Id. at 6 (arguing that because homosexual couples lack the procreative capacity
they argue marriage is designed for, Proposition 8 should be reviewed under the rational
basis test). However, contrary to proponents' assertion, procreative capacity has never
been a condition for granting couples the right to marry. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Marriage is not just about the right of individuals to
engage in sexual intercourse, and such an assertion demeans the relationship between mar-
ried couples. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that homo-
sexuals have the right to engage in private, consensual sexual activity)).
81. Defendant-Intervenors' Trial Memorandum at 6, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW), 2009 WL 4718817 (arguing that
because marriage is defined as a union between a man and a woman, excluding homosexu-
als from marriage is not discrimination based on sex).




IV. THE PERRY OPINION & THE ORDER DENYING A STAY
On August 4, 2010, Chief Judge Walker issued the trial court's opinion
in favor of the plaintiffs.8 3 His order enjoined the official defendants, and
all under their control, from enforcing Proposition 8.84 The decision
agreed with all substantive arguments presented by the plaintiffs, includ-
ing that Proposition 8 violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.ss
A. The Due Process Clause Challenge
Regarding the Due Process challenge, the Perry court acknowledged
that the Due Process Clause protects liberty interests, including the fun-
damental right to marry.8 6 For the trial court, the Due Process issue
turned on whether Proposition 8 impermissibly burdened the previously
recognized fundamental right to marry or whether finding a Due Process
violation would require the recognition of a new right.8 The court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs did not seek to establish a new right, but cor-
rectly asserted that Proposition 8 violated the right to marry as
understood by prior federal precedent.88 According to the court, the fun-
damental right to marry has always consisted of the freedom of two equal
individuals who consensually choose to seek state recognition of their re-
83. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 926, 994-95, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding Proposition 8 violated same-sex couples' rights under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
84. Id. at 1004 (explaining the remedial effects of the court's decision).
85. Id. at 993-95 (holding Proposition 8 excludes homosexuals from the institution of
marriage without rational justification and domestic partnerships are an inferior substitu-
tion for marriage).
86. Id. at 991-92 (citing Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (recognizing marriage
as a fundamental right, and as an "expression [] of emotional support and public commit-
ment"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 390-91 (1978) (overturning a statute re-
quiring counseling prior to marriage for individuals with prior support obligations because
it "unnecessarily interfered with the right to marry"); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (reiterating the idea of marriage and family life as a liberty
afforded protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (establishing the freedom to marry as one of the "vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (protecting the right of married individuals to use
contraceptives, referring to marriage as encompassing "a right of privacy older that the Bill
of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system").
87. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (setting out
the requirements for Due Process Clause analysis to determine if a right is fundamental).
88. Id. at 993 (distinguishing between the right plaintiffs seek, the right to marriage,
from what the plaintiffs do not seek-a new right to same-sex marriage).
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lationship as a civil and secular, rather than religious, "union of equals."8 9
The state's interest in recognizing and regulating marriage was to pro-
mote "stable households, which in turn form the basis of a stable, govern-
able populace."90
The trial court noted that absent from the essential characteristics of
the fundamental right to marry is any favor for procreation, the racial
composition of the couple, and the gender composition of the couple.9 '
Procreation had never defined the fundamental right to marry, as the
process of issuing of marriage licenses has never "inquired into [the
couple's] procreative capacity or intent."9 2 Rather, under the Supreme
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, procreation was a private
choice of a couple, regardless of a couple's marital status.9 3 Furthermore,
as the Supreme Court noted in Lawrence v. Texas, the fundamental right
to marry encompasses much more than the mere right to have sexual
relations.9 4
A preference for particular racial composition of two individuals who
marry is as irrelevant to the fundamental right to marry as procreation,
according to the trial court.9s Though racial restrictions on marriage
were common prior to the mid-1950s, the Supreme Court's invalidation
of these restrictions did not alter the definition of marriage or expand the
fundamental right to marry.96 Instead, because the fundamental right to
89. Id. (outlining the changes in social perspective regarding marriage throughout
history).
90. Id. at 992 (clarifying that a "procreative capacity or intent" is unnecessary for
either a marriage or to ensure the state's interest).
91. Id. (explaining that while interracial marriage statutes have been struck down,
among others, the institution of marriage has remained unchanged in the sense of being a
union between two consenting adults that want to be recognized for their commitment to
each other). The consistently recurring characteristics are: (1) two parties, (2) freely con-
senting, (3) to the formation of a relationship, (4) which entails supporting each other and
each other's dependents. Id.
92. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (disavowing
the mistaken belief that a marriage license is merely a license to procreate).
93. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)) (recognizing
choice and privacy are separate issues from procreative ability under Griswold).
94. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
95. See id. at 931-32 (drawing a comparison between interracial marriage before Lov-
ing v. Virginia, and the alleged government interest asserted by defendants in Perry that
procreation, or at least the ability to procreate, is necessary to a marriage and to society at
large).
96. Id. at 992 (providing an example where eliminating prejudicial marriage restric-
tions does not necessarily alter what it means to be married).
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marry concerned the choice of two consenting adults, racial restrictions
on marriage were impermissible burdens on the right to marry.97
The Perry court then explained that gender no longer plays an essential
role in the fundamental right to marry. 98 California's doctrine of cover-
ture, which once required that a woman become the property of her hus-
band upon marriage, is now abolished and is legally irrelevant to
marriage, since the State recognized legal parity between the sexes.99
Like the notion of preferred racial composition of a married couple
before it, the notion of a preferred gender composition is merely a histor-
ical shaping of marriage, rather than an essential characteristic of the fun-
damental right to marry under the Due Process Clause. 00 After
concluding that Proposition 8 burdened the fundamental right to marry,
the trial court determined that Proposition 8 lacked a compelling, or even
a legitimate, governmental justification.'o'
The trial court further determined that California's option for domestic
partnerships failed to satisfy due process requirements, offering two rea-
97. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining
why the Court struck down the statute at issue in Loving v. Virginia).
98. Id. (discussing gender in terms of how it is historically related to marriage). Attor-
ney Katherine K. Baker argues that advocates for same-sex marriage experience problems
in court because courts have failed to provide a proper definition of the institution of
marriage. Katherine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. SruD. 1, 1-2
(2010). Even though the law does not touch gender roles within marriage, the fact that
same-sex couples are not allowed to marry results in a gendered institution. Id. at 28. By
only allowing opposite-sex couples to marry, a state "reifies" gender, which is a result of
the importance society places on "the expressive and constitutive benefits of marriage."
Id. Baker suggests, "that which makes marriage a fundamental right may, in and of itself,
create a gender equality problem." Id.
99. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing
historical changes in the law that affected gender roles within the marriage). The doctrine
of coverture originated in England and was brought to the American colonies. Claudia
Zaher, When a Woman's Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on
the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459, 459 (2002). Coverture left
the wife with no legal existence; for example, once married, everything she owned or ac-
quired came under the control of her husband. Id. at 460-61. After the Industrial Revolu-
tion, society began to recognize wealth as a more important social value, which resulted in
weakening the doctrine through the passage of Married Women's Property Acts. Id. at
461-62. Law librarian Claudia Zaher argues that some of the stigma of coverture contin-
ues to affect women today, particularly in regard to gender equality. Id. at 462.
100. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (compar-
ing the stigma of same-sex marriage to the prejudice historically directed at interracial
couples).
101. Id. at 995. "[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to [a] vote; they depend
on the outcome of no elections." Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). The trial court referred to its discussion of state interests in its equal
protection clauses analysis. See subpart IV, subsection B of this Article.
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sons in support.'0 2 First was the "symbolic disparity" between marriage
and domestic partnerships.'o3 Plaintiff-couple Zarrillo and Katami testi-
fied that "marriage has a 'special meaning' that would alter their relation-
ships with family and others."'O4 Based on the testimony of the plaintiffs,
the court found that marriage holds a "culturally superior status" to do-
mestic partnership.os Second, because California's domestic partnership
option provided the exact same rights to same-sex couples as marriage
did to opposite-sex couples, the only justification for the creation of the
parallel institution was to withhold the social benefits of marriage from
same-sex couples.' 0 6
B. The Equal Protection Clause Challenges
The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs on all of their Equal Protec-
tion contentions: that Proposition 8 discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation; that sexual orientation is a suspect class deserving of strict
scrutiny; Proposition 8 also discriminates on the basis of sex, and should
be subject to heightened scrutiny; and that Proposition 8 fails to survive
even a rational basis review.'o?
The court disagreed with the defendant-intervenors' position that Pro-
position 8 did not discriminate because it was not facially targeted at
homosexuals because it did not reference homosexuality. 08 It stated that
Proposition 8 discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation because
prohibitions on same-sex marriage prevented homosexual and bisexual
102. Id. at 994 (comparing domestic partnerships to marriage).
103. Id. at 994, 996 (noting that proponents of Proposition 8 do not dispute that a
domestic partnership is inferior, symbolically speaking, to marriage).
104. Id. at 932 (explaining that many day-to-day activities are made more awkward or
difficult for Zarrillo and Katami because they cannot simply state that they are married).
Zarrillo and Katami brought up an instance where they attempted to open a joint bank
account, but they had to set it up as either a business account or a partnership because they
were not married. Id. at 932-33. Perry and Stier, the other plaintiff couple, stated that
being able to marry would "make them feel included 'in the social fabric." Id. at 933.
105. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (affirming the
contention that California disadvantages the plaintiffs by only allowing them to enter into
domestic partnerships and not marriage). The court determined that California could not
fulfill its due process obligation to permit people to marry when its alternative is an infer-
ior institution designed to prohibit marriage for gay couples. Id.
106. Id. at 994 (contrasting California's designations of "marriage" and "domestic
partnership").
107. Id. at 995-98 (agreeing with the arguments presented by plaintiffs in favor of
same-sex marriage).
108. Id. at 996 (criticizing the proponents' attempts to mask the discriminatory intent
of Proposition 8 since the only parties affected by the law were homosexuals).
380 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 13:363
TRYING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
couples from marrying the consenting person of their choice, whereas
heterosexual couples could marry.109
After noting that some discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
may also constitute discrimination on the basis of sex, the court held that
Proposition 8 was an example of such discrimination.i" 0 It reasoned that
a woman in California could not marry a consenting person of her choice
if that person was also a woman, but, if she were a man, California law
would recognize the marriage."' As such, the court determined that Pro-
position 8 must pass the heightened scrutiny required for laws making
sex-based classifications.1 1 2
The trial court went even further in concluding that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to strict scrutiny review
under the Equal Protection Clause.1 1 3 The rationale turned on the histor-
ical unequal treatment of gays and lesbians and the ability of homosexual
individuals to live in society free of "impairment in judgment or general
social or vocational capabilities" merely due to their homosexuality." 4
Though the court viewed strict scrutiny as the proper standard of re-
view, it conducted a justification-by-justification analysis, ultimately con-
cluding that none of the defendant-intervenors' groups of purported
justifications for Proposition 8 was rationally related to legitimate govern-
mental interests.'" 5 The court rejected the first group of purported ratio-
nales, which concerned preserving the traditional functions of
marriage."' 6 It based its rejection on a Supreme Court holding that tradi-
tion alone constitutes no legitimate governmental interest for a discrimi-
109. Id. at 994 (discussing the differences between and the interrelation of sex dis-
crimination versus discrimination based on sexual orientation); see also Massachusetts v.
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 248, 253 (D. Mass. 2010)
(rejecting the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) of 1996 as unconstitutional). The
DOMA was signed into law by President Clinton in 1996 and § 3 explicitly provides "the
word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a hus-
band or a wife." Id. at 236.
110. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (equating
discrimination against same-sex couples to discrimination based on gender).
111. Id.
112. Id. (determining the applicable standard of review based on its view of same-sex
marriage as a gender discrimination issue).
113. Id. at 997 (recommending strict scrutiny for gender-based equal protection chal-
lenges, including for Proposition 8).
114. Id. at 967 (relating that the proponents of Proposition 8 could only point to one
difference between same-sex and heterosexual couples).
115. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997-1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
116. Id. at 998 (asserting that tradition alone is not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest).
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natory classification.' 7  Moreover, the court noted that marriage in
California had abandoned traditionally required gender roles for a man
and a woman in a marriage." 8 According to the court, "Proposition 8
thus enshrines in the California Constitution a gender restriction that the
evidence shows to be nothing more than an artifact of a foregone notion
that men and women fulfill different roles in civic life."119
The court similarly rejected the second group of purported interests,
which proposed justifications concerning "proceeding with caution when
implementing social changes."120 It found that, based on the plaintiffs'
evidence at trial, permitting same-sex marriage would not affect the mar-
riage rights of opposite-sex couples.12 1 It also determined that the defen-
dant-intervenors' evidence lacked credibility on the issue, as California
had previously recognized approximately eighteen thousand same-sex
marriages.122
The defendant-intervenors' third group of justifications-all relating to
the preference given to opposite sex couples with regards to child rear-
ing-equally failed to satisfy the court.123 Five findings of facts dissuaded
the court from accepting these justifications. First, the court found that
same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents were equally qualified to raise
children.124 Second, it found that Proposition 8 in no way encouraged
opposite-sex couples to have more biological children.125 Third, Proposi-
tion 8 did not relate to raising children, as same-sex couples may raise
117. Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993)); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 239-40 (1970) (rejecting the idea that what is traditional should always be preserved).
118. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting the
tradition of limiting a citizen's choice of spouse arose at a time when spouses were legally-
mandated to follow gender-defined roles).
119. Id. (stating that California's constitutional amendment codifies antiquated no-
tions of gender).
120. Id. (dispelling proponents' argument that same-sex marriage would cause vast
and sweeping social change).
121. Id. at 998-99 (noting defendants' argument that allowing same-sex couples to
marry would result in negative consequences for society as well as the institution of
marriage).
122. Id. at 999-1003 (referring to the court's view that the evidence provided in sup-
port of Proposition 8 was weak in proving detrimental societal repercussions for granting
same-sex couples the right to marry).
123. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 900-1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (recog-
nizing plaintiffs' argument that a child's stability and growth would be adversely effected
by same-sex parents did not persuade the court).
124. Id. at 999 (highlighting the relevant findings of fact that served as the basis for
the court's ruling against Proposition 8, including Chief Judge Vaughn Walker's belief that
gender did not affect parenting ability).
125. Id. at 999-1000.
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and adopt children in California.126 Fourth, by refusing to recognize
same-sex marriages, Proposition 8 necessarily required an increase of ex-
tramarital sex.12 7 And finally, the defendant-intervenors' evidence failed
to convince the court that Proposition 8 reduced any household instabil-
ity caused by the members of the couple being of the same-sex.'2 8
The fourth group of purported justifications also failed. These pur-
ported interests attempted to justify Proposition 8 on the grounds that it
protected the rights of same-sex marriage opponents under the First
Amendment, and their rights to provide moral education for their chil-
dren.12 9 The court rejected these interests, pointing out that California
law prohibits discrimination with regard to public accommodations for
same-sex domestic partnerships and marriage.'3 0 It also held that, as a
matter of law, Proposition 8 does nothing to take away the rights of mar-
ried couples to oppose same-sex marriage or to teach their children to
oppose same-sex marriage.13 1
Fifth, the court held that Proposition 8 cannot be supported by any
justifications of keeping different classifications of relationships dis-
tinct.13 2 After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the court found
moral and religious views to form the only basis for distinguishing be-
tween the different classes of couples.1 33 As a matter of law, the court
overruled the defendant-intervenors' contention that Proposition 8 "ad-
vances administrative convenience," as the Supreme Court has rejected
this as a legitimate government interest under the rational basis test.134
And to the extent that California had an interest in easing administrative
burdens, the court questioned the burden of recognizing relationships
126. Id. at 1000.
127. Id.
128. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (referring to
testimony by David Blankenhorn, defendants' expert witness "on marriage, fatherhood
and family structure"). The Court pointed to Blankenhorn's dismissal of a study regarding
same-sex marriage, even though he had never seen it before the trial, as evidence that his
views were unreliable. Id. at 949. The study by Laura Langbein and Mark A. Yost, Jr.
found same-sex marriage laws "have no adverse effect on marriage, divorce, and abortion
rates, the percent of children born out of wedlock, or the percent of households with chil-
dren under 18 headed by women." Id.
129. Id. at 1000-01 (citing the court's skepticism of Blankenhorn's testimony by say-
ing he was defensive, failed to answer questions directly on cross-examination and
presented conflicting testimony and expert opinions).
130. Id.
131. Id. (disapproving the theory that allowing same-sex marriage would result in the
infringement of proponents' First Amendment rights).
132. Id. at 1001.
133. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
134. Id. at 1001 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)).
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through two separate institutions that provide identical benefits and are
almost identical in character.'3 5
Sixth, and finally, the court denied the defendant-intervenors' catchall
interest, which offered "[any other conceivable legitimate interests iden-
tified by the parties, amici, or the court at any stage of the proceed-
ings." 1 3 6 It classified many of the remaining interests as resting on
"nothing more than a fear or unarticulated dislike of same-sex couples,"
which the court proceeded to explain was insufficient under rational basis
scrutiny."' This private moral view that same-sex couples are inferior to
opposite-sex couples, the court explained, constitutes impermissible "ani-
mus towards gays and lesbians" rather than a legitimate government in-
terest.138 At this juncture, the court found that the Yes on 8 Campaign's
efforts
[R]elied heavily on negative stereotypes about gays and lesbians and
focused on protecting children from inchoate threats vaguely associ-
ated with gays and lesbians. . . . The evidence showled) . . . that Pro-
position 8 played on a fear that exposure to homosexuality would
turn children into homosexuals and that parents should dread having
children who are not heterosexual.' 3 9
Because moral disapproval, in the absence of any valid state interest,
failed to justify the passage of Proposition 8, the court concluded that
Proposition 8 did not meet the basic requirements of the rational basis
test and thus violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.14 0
135. Id. (addressing defendants' argument that Proposition 8 is justified by adminis-
trative convenience).
136. Id. (rejecting the defendants' final proposed governmental interest in proposing
and defending Proposition 8).
137. Id. at 1002 (emphasizing that when Chief Judge Vaughn Walker discounted the
justifications advanced by Proposition 8 proponents, all that remained was the likelihood
that the proponents supported Proposition 8 because they fear and dislike homosexuals).
138. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000-01 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
139. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting a
proponent of Proposition 8 for demonstrative purposes to show that much of the evidence
presented in campaigning and defending Proposition 8 at trial was merely opinion and not
fact). The proponents of Proposition 8 presented one witness to prove their twenty-three
arguments. Id. at 931. In the end, the witness identified only one difference between
same-sex and heterosexual couples-some heterosexuals are able to create biological off-
spring. Id. at 932.
140. Id. at 1003 (citing the court's holding that Proposition 8 unconstitutionally in-
fringes on an individual's right to due process and equal protection under the law).
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C. The Trial Court's Denial of the Stay
Following the trial court's decision on the merits, the defendant-inter-
venors moved to stay the judgment,14 1 and the trial court denied the mo-
tion.1 4 2 It noted that a stay is not granted as a matter of right, and that to
be entitled to a stay, it must consider the following factors:
(1) whether proponents have made a strong showing that they are
likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether proponents will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether the stay will substantially injure other interested parties;
and
(4) whether the stay is in the public interest.1 4 3
Regarding the first element, the trial court concluded that defendant-
intervenors were unlikely to succeed on the merits for two reasons. It
noted that they probably lacked standing to appeal the case, as they have
no authority to enforce Proposition 8 and because they presented little to
no credible evidence at trial.14 4 Under the court's reasoning, only the
141. Order Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW, 2010 WL 3025614
(Aug. 12, 2010), at 2; see Order Denying Defendant-Intervenors' Motion to Stay Pending
Appeal at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292
VRW), available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/Final-stay-order.pdf
(indicating that defendant-intervenors are the only parties requesting a stay from enjoining
Proposition 8).
142. Order Denying Defendant-Intervenors' Motion to Stay Pending Appeal at 6,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW),
available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/Final stay-order.pdf (finding
that defendant-intervenors were unable to meet any of the factors necessary to justify a
stay). Neither Governor Schwarzenegger nor the Attorney General Brown supported a
stay and both separately filed opposition memoranda in response to defendants' motion
for a stay, "respectfully" urging its denial. The Administration's Opposition to Defendant-
Intervenors' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW), 2010 WL 3065300; Attorney General's
Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292 VRW).
143. Order Denying Defendant-Intervenors' Motion to Stay Pending Appeal at 6,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW),
available at https://ecf.cand.uscourtsgov/cand/09cv2292/files/Final stay__.order.pdf (quoting
Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)) (emphasizing the difficulty of
successfully moving for a stay "even if irreparable injury might otherwise result" because
the decision is still left to the trial court's sound discretion).
144. Id. (diluting the strength of the legal arguments put forth by proponents at trial
by showing deficiencies in their arguments and evidence on critical threshold issues); see
also Michael J. Ritter, Note, Standing in the Way of Animal Welfare: A Reconsideration of
the Zone-of-Interest "Gloss" on the Administrative Procedures Act, 29 REv. LiTfG. 951, 964
(2010) (outlining the modern requirements for Article III standing as including an (1) an
injury in fact, which invades a legally protected right, and is concrete, particularized and
actual or imminent; (2) causation; and (3) redressibility). The scope of Article III standing
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official defendants in Perry have Article III standing to pursue an ap-
peal.14 5 The court decided the second factor against the defendant-inter-
venors because they failed to show that they, themselves, would be
irreparably injured by a denial of the stay.146
After noting that the first two factors were the "most critical," the
court explained that its previous analysis was sufficient to deny the stay,
but proceeded to address the remaining two factors.147 The court deter-
mined that based on the evidence at trial, the only parties the court
thought might be harmed would be the same-sex couples who were una-
ble to marry because of Proposition 8.148 With regard to the fourth fac-
tor, the court rejected the defendant-intervenors' contention that a denial
of a stay would harm the public interest because California voters de-
cided to enact Proposition 8.149 It concluded that the evidence at trial
has evolved over the last 80 years as the Supreme Court abandoned the limited "Case" and
"Controversy" language and "abandoned the legal right test." Id. at 963. The newest iter-
ation of Article III standing, as numerated above, was set forth by Justice Scalia in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992);
Michael J. Ritter, Note, Standing in the Way of Animal Welfare: A Reconsideration of the
Zone-of-Interest "Gloss" on the Administrative Procedures Act, 29 Ri7v. LITIG. 951, 964
(2010). Even with the changes to the Article III doctrine individuals seeking standing still
need to overcome the zone-of-interest test. Michael J. Ritter, Note, Standing in the Way of
Animal Welfare: A Reconsideration of the Zone-of-Interest "Gloss" on the Administrative
Procedures Act, 29 Rev. LIIG. 951, 952 (2010). The zone-of-interest test is a self-imposed
judicial development that seeks to balance the ability of individuals to seek redress for
harm suffered with executive branch actions. Id. at 969.
145. Order Denying Defendant-Intervenors' Motion to Stay Pending Appeal at 5,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW).
146. Id. at 7 (noting that the proponents "do not identify a harm to them that would
result from denial of their motion to stay"). The proponents argued that the state will be
harmed if a stay is not granted, as harm is the natural consequence that flows from en-
joining an enactment of the people. Id. Furthermore, they argued that any marriage oc-
curring after judgment yet before the appeal is decided will be subject to "a cloud of
uncertainty." Id. Both of these arguments by the proponents failed, as they are: (1) not
the state, (2) are not themselves attempting to wed someone of the same sex, and (3)
already admit that the harms they discern only apply to "affected couples and ... the
State." Id.
147. Id. at 8 (analyzing the last two factors despite already determining the stay will
be denied).
148. Id. at 8-9 (accepting the argument by plaintiffs that harm would result from a
stay and that it would hinder their access to relief).
149. Id. at 10 (refuting proponents' argument that the public interest would be dam-
aged if a stay were denied, as there would still be confusion for marriages, before the
constitutionality of Proposition 8 is determined). Although, the proponents believe that
because Proposition 8 received a majority of votes the public interest would be damaged if
a stay is denied. Id.
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showed that the implementation of Proposition 8 actually harmed the
State of California.'so
The defendant-intervenors challenged the trial court's decision on the
stay to the Ninth Circuit, which scheduled oral argument for the case for
December 2010.'"' On its own motion, the Ninth Circuit panel expedited
the case. 15 2 Without explanation, the panel granted the defendant-inter-
venors' motion to stay the trial court's denial of the stay until the Ninth
Circuit decided the issue.' The Ninth Circuit's order requested that the
parties brief both the merits of the case, as well as the Article III standing
issue discussed by the trial court's order denying the stay.'54
V. PERRY'S POSSIBILITIES
At the outset of Perry, many expected the case to be appealed to and
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.' Given the civil
150. Order Denying Defendant-Intervenors' Motion to Stay Pending Appeal at 10,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW)
(finding that denying a stay would harm California).
151. Cynthia Laird, Uncertainty for Prop 8 Ballot repeal, BAY AREA REi., Aug. 19,
2010, http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=news&article=4998 (confirming oral argu-
ments will be heard by the Ninth Circuit in the first part of December 2010).
152. Order at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW (9th Cir. Aug. 17,
2010) available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/08/17/10-16751_or-
der.pdf (establishing accelerated briefing dates for both parties). Proponents of Proposi-
tion 8 requested a stay until their case could be heard on appeal. See Order at 2 Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.
ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/08/16/order-motionstay.pdf.
153. Order at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
2010), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/08/16/ordermotion
stay.pdf. (granting appellant's motion to stay Chief Judge Walker's order enjoining en-
forcement of Proposition 8). The decision by the Ninth Circuit temporarily vacated the
district court's decision to deny defendants' stay. See id.; Order at 2, Perry v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C 09-2292 VRW), available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/
cand/09cv2292/files/Final stay-order.pdf (denying the defendants' motion for stay in the
trial court).
154. Order at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
2010), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/08/16/order-motion
_stay.pdf.
155. See Carlos Santoscoy, Gay Groups Not Welcome in Federal Marriage Suit, ON
Tor MAG., Aug. 8, 2009, http://www.ontopmag.com/article.aspx?id=4349&MediaType=l&
Category=26 (mentioning the possibility of gay rights groups intervening in the Perry case
due to the momentum of the case); David Cole, How Will Gay Marriage Fare in the Su-
preme Court?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS BLoc (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.nybooks.
com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/aug/1 1/how-will-gay-marriage-fare-supreme-court (discussing fac-
tors indicative of a Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage); Jesse McKinley, An-
other Round in Same-Sex Marriage Case, N.Y. TIMi-s, Aug. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/08/16/us/politics/16prop.html; Lanae Erickson & Jon Cowan, Moving the Middle
on Marriage, Poiirico.com, (Aug. 19, 2010, 4:51 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/sto-
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rights goals of the plaintiffs, the religious and moral tenets of the only
participating defendants, the nature of the relief that the plaintiffs seek,
and the representation of the plaintiffs by Boies and Olson,'56 both sides
were rightfully expected to seek a final resolution of the decision by the
court of last resort in the United States.' However, given the current
status of the case, concern has shifted from the Supreme Court's determi-
nation of the merits of the case to the Supreme Court's determination of
the standing issue. At most, any conclusions about Perry's probable fu-
ture would likely be based on conjecture as to the parties' litigation strat-
egies and the likely voting of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Instead of speculating about Perry's probable fate, this Part concludes the
Article with a discussion of the possibilities for Perry, and the impact of
those possible outcomes on the parties of the case.
A. Standing
Prior to considering the merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit, and possi-
bly the Supreme Court, might resolve whether Chief Judge Walker erred
in denying the defendant-intervenors' request for the stay by holding that
the defendant-intervenors lack standing to appeal the trial court's judg-
ment. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit, which is expected to release its deci-
ries/0810/41214.html (asserting that the Supreme Court will eventually have to decide
whether to uphold or reverse the District Court's decision on Proposition 8); Maura Dolan,
Prop. 8 Trial to Include Unprecedented Testimony, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2010/jan/11/local/la-me-prop8-triall1-201Ojanl1 (noting that from the be-
ginning of the trial, commentators and the parties themselves expected the case to reach
the Supreme Court in the fall of 2011).
156. John W. Dean, The Olson/Boies Challenge to California's Proposition 8: A High-
Risk Effort, FINDLAw (May 29, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20090529.html
(discussing Boies and Olson, including their previous history working together and their
ultimate plans for disposition of their Proposition 8 challenge).
157. See Jesse McKinley, Another Round in Same-Sex Marriage Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/us/politics/16prop.html (suggesting the
circumstances surrounding resolution of Proposition 8 may be favorable for Supreme
Court review); Lanae Erickson & Jon Cowan, Moving the Middle on Marriage, Pour-
Ico.com, (Aug. 19, 2010, 4:51 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/41214.html;
see, e.g., Maura Dolan, L.A. County Registrar's Office in Norwalk to Stay Open Late
Wednesday for Gay Marriages, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
lanow/prop_8; David Cole, How Will Gay Marriage Fare in the Supreme Court?, N.Y. REv.
OF BOOKs BLOG (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/
aug/11/how-will-gay-marriage-fare-supreme-court.
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sion toward the beginning of 2011,' might thereby avoid addressing the
merits of the case.'
Either way the Ninth Circuit panel decides, the losing party could ap-
peal the decision to the Supreme Court.'" Like the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court may dodge the issues presented at trial by deciding that
the defendants probably lack standing to appeal.161 If either the Ninth
Circuit or the Supreme Court held that the parties lacked standing, those
decisions could spell an end to Perry. The Ninth Circuit certified a ques-
tion regarding the defendant-intervenors' standing under State law, stat-
ing that the outcome will depend on whether California law affords them
a sufficient state-recognized interest to form the basis of its injury in fact
to satisfy Article III.162
B. The Merits
Because the defendants have filed a Notice of Appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit will consider the appeal and issue a decision," which could officially
dispose of the case on standing grounds, as previously discussed, or reach
the merits. In reviewing the decision of the trial court, the Ninth Circuit
would review Chief Judge Walker's findings of facts under an abuse of
discretion standard, and would conduct a de novo review of his conclu-
sions of law.1 6 4
158. Court Halts Calif Gay Marriages Pending Appeal, ASSOCIATED PREsS (Aug. 17,
2010, 2:06 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38730337/ns/usnews-life (reporting on the
Ninth Circuit's decision to stay Chief Judge Walker's order allowing same-sex marriage
licenses to be issued before the defendant-intervenors appeal).
159. Whether the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court will determine that the standing
issue precludes the defendant-intervenors from appealing the merits is unclear. It is not
even clear that the defendant-intervenors have standing to appeal the trial court's order as
to the stay. Cf Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1814 (2010) (holding an appellant had
standing to appeal a judgment in his favor). The Court noted that a party has a "judicially
cognizable" interest in assuring that a judgment in his favor is enforced. Id. at 1814-15. As
noted in the majority opinion, "[h]aving obtained a final judgment granting relief on his
claims, Buono had standing to seek its vindication." Id. at 1815.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006) (explaining the available methods of appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States).
161. Id.
162. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), certified question
accepted (Feb. 16, 2011).
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (conferring jurisdiction to the Ninth Circuit
when appealing a final decision from the district court); see generally Notice of Appeal,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW)
(recognizing that the case continues to move through the appellate process and has yet to
reach a final conclusion).




To reverse in favor of the proponents of Proposition 8 on the merits,
the Ninth Circuit would have to disagree with the trial court on all of its
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause holdings. At this phase,
the Perry plaintiffs could decide to seek review of the case by the Su-
preme Court or to not pursue such review. A decision that disfavors the
plaintiffs on both the Equal Protection and Due Process grounds would
leave intact Due Process and Equal Protection precedent that could pos-
sibly hinder future litigation efforts of gays and lesbians under these con-
stitutional provisions in the Ninth Circuit, as well as other courts
persuaded by the opinion. However, a review and reversal of the trial
court by the Supreme Court would create even more detrimental prece-
dent that would be binding on all circuit courts of appeals.
Alternatively, to affirm in favor of the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit
would need to agree with the trial court's decision as to only one of the
grounds for its decision, whether it is Due Process or Equal Protection.
Such an outcome would leave the defendants with the decision of
whether to seek or not seek review from the Supreme Court. It is still
within the realm of possibility that the defendant-intervenors would not
seek Supreme Court review of an unfavorable Ninth Circuit decision,
quite possibly to prevent an impactful Supreme Court opinion adverse to
the religious right's interest.
If the party losing on appeal to the Ninth Circuit sought review by the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court could decide to either grant or deny
the party's petition for writ of certiorari. 65 A denial of the petition
would permit the Ninth Circuit decision-whether in favor of the plain-
tiffs or defendant-intervenors-to stand, and the losing side would have
no recourse. Commentators have speculated whether the Supreme Court
would even grant certiorari to hear Perry given the novelty of gay mar-
riage, and many have guessed which justices would favor, and which jus-
tices would disfavor, hearing the case.' 6 6 However, the relatively recent
confirmations of Justice Sonya Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan cast
more doubt on these speculations. But because the Court needs only a
vote of four justices to grant certiorari, either outcome is, of course,
possible. 167
165. See Rutherford v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1967) (noting that
the Supreme Court's review of decisions of the circuit courts of appeals is discretionary).
The court noted that such review is not a matter of right. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006).
166. David Cole, How Will Gay Marriage Fare in the Supreme Court?, N.Y. Reiv. OF
BOOKS BLOG (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/aug/
11/how-will-gay-marriage-fare-supreme-court (theorizing that the Supreme Court is very
nearly split on the constitutionality of Proposition 8).
167. Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 362 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1966)
(quoting Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953)) (discussing denial of certiorari gener-
[Vol. 13:363390
TRYING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
If the Supreme Court decided to grant the petition to hear the case, it
would then issue an opinion on the case. In addition to the amicus curiae
briefs the Court would review, the Court's broad discretion would leave
more potential variations as to a substantive ruling by the Supreme Court
than might be possible at the Ninth Circuit. Certainly though, a Supreme
Court decision would either finally dispose of the case by holding that the
defendants lack standing, leave Proposition 8 unenforceable under the
trial court's order and lift any stay, or permit California officials to con-
tinue to deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
A reversal of the trial court decision would have disastrous conse-
quences for the lesbian and gay rights movement, particularly with regard
to making societal advances through constitutional litigation strategies.
Such negative precedent from the Supreme Court would make Perry the
first case since Bowers v. Hardwickl68 to fail to offer legal parity to homo-
sexuals in the same manner as heterosexuals under the Constitution; the
decision might even reverse the gains made in Lawrence v. Texas' 69 and
Romer v. Evans.170
An affirmation by the Supreme Court would potentially be a huge vic-
tory for the gay and lesbian rights movement, offering additional positive
precedent to advance its goals. The Court might hedge against this vic-
tory by limiting its decision to the unique situation of California and the
context in which Proposition 8 passed. Several of Chief Judge Walker's
holdings regarding the defendant-intervenors' purported legitimate gov-
ernment interests relied on the unique laws of California, some with re-
gard to the parallel institution of domestic partnerships, the eighteen
thousand valid same-sex marriages, and same-sex adoption.17' The ratio-
nale for the rejection of these interests simply might not apply in other
states that do not recognize domestic partnerships for same-sex couples
or the right of same-sex couples to adopt.172 These holdings as to the lack
ally). The Supreme Court has previously noted that the denial of certiorari is often undis-
closed. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953). Denial may be based on reasons that are
unrelated to the merits of the case. Id.
168. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (upholding a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy even in the
privacy of one's home).
169. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
170. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); see Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez,
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010) (upholding the Hastings College of Law non-discrimination
policy for student organizations).
171. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997-1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (dis-
cussing proponents' failure in providing sufficient evidence to advance each of their six
purported government interests).
172. See, e.g., Michael J. Ritter, Note, Adoption by Same-Sex Couples: Public Policy
Issues in Texas Law & Practice, 15 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 235, 235 (2010) (explaining that
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of a rational basis for Proposition 8 underpin to a substantial degree the
trial court's conclusions as to both the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause.17 3
Finally, even if the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision,
Perry's story may not end there. As the history of Proposition 8 demon-
strates, judicial victories on constitutional grounds are not immune from
constitutional amendment.'7 4 Though discussions about passing an
amendment to the federal constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage
have dwindled since President George W. Bush's reelection campaign in
2004,' a decision by the Supreme Court in favor of gay marriage might
revitalize public efforts for an amendment to overturn the decision. The
passage of Proposition 8 in the state most protective of the rights of gays
and lesbians 7 6 indicates that a serious push for such an amendment
would not be surprising.
The future of Perry is uncertain at best. The various possibilities of
decisions by any of the parties on either side regarding the pursuit of
appeal, or decisions by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court on the
procedural aspects or merits of the case, cast suspicion on any prediction
about Perry's fate. The long road leading up to Perry might end in the
Ninth Circuit; it might result in the biggest win for gays and lesbians in
the U.S. Supreme Court since Lawrence; or it may even result in a consti-
tutional amendment overturning a Supreme Court decision affirming the
trial court and thus reversing relatively recent gains by the gay and les-
bian movement. But, of the multiplicity of possibilities, and despite its
Texas adoption statutes are ambiguous as to whether same-sex couples may adopt chil-
dren). Currently, ten states and the District of Columbia have explicit statutes sanctioning
the adoption of a child by a same-sex couples. Id. at 240. Additionally, at least eighteen
additional states provide some avenue for adoption by same-sex couples and four states
explicitly bar same-sex couples from entering into adoptions. Id.
173. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-99 (N.D. Cal. August 4,2010).
174. For a complete discussion of gay marriage in California, refer to Section II of this
Article.
175. Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Banning Gay Mar-
riage, WASI. Pos-r, Feb. 25, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2004/02/25/AR2005032201695pf.html (referring to the comments made by President Bush
in regard to ensuring marriage be reserved to a man and a woman by permanently chang-
ing the Constitution to reflect that idea).
176. See Veronique de Turenne, California-The Most Gay-Friendly State in the
Union, L.A. TimEs BiLoG (Oct. 9, 2008, 9:03 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/
2008/10/california-t.html; see also Laws, HRC-CALIFORNIA, http://www.hrc.org/your
community/californialcalifornialaws.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2010) (detailing the various
laws in California protecting LGBT people and their families from discrimination).
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ultimate fate, Perry will likely live up to commentators' description as the
most-watched civil rights case of this decade."'
177. See, e.g., Ted Olson Supports Carly Fiorina's Senate Bid. Carly Fiorina Supports
Prop 8. Huh!, QUERTiY.COM (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.queerty.com/ted-olson-supports-
carly-fiori nas-sen ate-bid-carly-fiorina-supports-prop-8-huh-20100804.
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